The University of the Pacific Law Review
Volume 49
Issue 1 Symposium—Regulating Marijuana at Home
and Abroad

Article 9

1-1-2017

Memo to Cannabis Regulators: The Expressions
Hair Design Decision Does Not Limit Your Broad
Authority to Restrict All Forms of Discounting
Leslie Gielow Jacobs
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, ljacobs@pacific.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uoplawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Leslie G. Jacobs, Memo to Cannabis Regulators: The Expressions Hair Design Decision Does Not Limit Your Broad Authority to Restrict All
Forms of Discounting, 49 U. Pac. L. Rev. 67 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uoplawreview/vol49/iss1/9

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in The University of the Pacific Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
mgibney@pacific.edu.

Memo to Cannabis Regulators: The Expressions Hair
Design Decision Does Not Limit Your Broad Authority to
Restrict All Forms of Discounting
Leslie Gielow Jacobs*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 67

II. BACKGROUND TO COMMERCIAL SPEECH ...................................................... 73
III. PRICE DISCOUNTING IN THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH FRAMEWORK ............... 75
A. 44 Liquormart ......................................................................................... 75
B. Recent Lower Court Decisions ................................................................ 78
IV. EXPRESSIONS HAIR DESIGN V. SCHNEIDERMAN ............................................ 80
V. REGULATORS’ UNCHANGED AUTHORITY TO RESTRICT THE PRICING
PRACTICE OF DISCOUNTING AFTER EXPRESSIONS HAIR DESIGN ................... 85
VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 86
I. INTRODUCTION
Cannabis discounts, like the drug itself, act through the brain to trigger
physical responses of happiness and relaxation.1 A 2012 study found that
customers who received a $10 voucher experienced a 38% rise in oxytocin
levels, their respiration rates dropped 32%, their heart rates decreased by 5% and
their sweat levels were 20 times lower than shoppers who did not receive the
incentive.2 Sellers know about these physical effects of price discounting and
exploit them to expand their customer bases, increase brand loyalty, and boost
profitability and sales.3 The discount-pleasure-sales chain reaction may be
mutually beneficial to sellers and consumers, at least in the short term. This

* Professor of Law and Director, Capital Center for Law & Policy, University of the Pacific, McGeorge
School of Law. Thanks to Maureen Moran for cite-checking assistance.
1. Danny Wong, What Science Says About Discounts, Promotions, and Free Offers, HUFFINGTON POST
(Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/danny-wong/what-science-says-about-discounts_b_851
1224.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. Jack Loechner, A Rationale for Coupons (If You Need One), MEDIA POST: APPY AWARDS (Dec. 12,
2012), https://www.mediapost.com/appyawards/article/189450/a-rationale-for-coupons-if-you-need-one.html
(cited in Wong, supra n.1.) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (the study was
commissioned by Coupons.com).
3. Wong, supra note 1 (stating that sellers also employ pricing techniques other than discounting to
increase sales); Pius Boachie, 5 Strategies of ‘Psychological Pricing,’ ENTREPRENEUR (July 21, 2016),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/279464 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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Pavlovian dynamic can be disastrous, however, when sellers deploy it to
undermine government efforts to adjust price to reduce demand for products, like
tobacco, alcohol, gambling, and now cannabis, which are dangerous to minors at
low levels and to all consumers in excess.
Of course, sellers rely on psychological studies to craft their branding, media
presence, and advertising to attract consumers and stimulate sales.4 Studies show
that “85% of a purchasing decision is emotional and only 15% rational,”5 that
colors trigger emotions, that image placement directs attention and retention of a
message, and that humor provokes social media sharing and brand memory.6
Cannabis sellers in newly legalized markets are following the same trajectory of
tobacco and alcohol, employing experts,7 expanding media platforms,8 using
established9 and novel techniques,10 moving from “wellness ads to mainstream,
lifestyle-oriented ones,”11 and focusing on branding12 to build and cement market
share.

4. Amar Hussain, Marketing Psychology: 9 Strategies to Influence Consumers, FEINTERNATIONAL (Feb.
25, 2015), https://feinternational.com/blog/marketing-psychology-9-strategies-influence-consumers/; Eden
Ames, 8 Psychological Tips for Your Marketing Strategy, AMERICAN MARKETING ASSOCIATION,
https://www.ama.org/publications/MarketingNews/Pages/8-Psychological-Tips-for-Your-MarketingStrategy.aspx; Brett Langlois, 6 Psychology Studies With Marketing Implications, POWERED BY SEARCH,
https://www.poweredbysearch.com/blog/psychology-of-marketing/ (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
5. Luisa Brenton, 5 Psychological Tactics to Influence Consumers, JUST CREATIVE (July 27, 2016),
justcreative.com/2016/07/27/5-psychological-tactics-to-influence-consumers/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
6. Id.
7. MARIJUANA MARKETING GURUS, available at http://marijuanamarketinggurus.com/ (last visited June
27, 2017), (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review).
8. Peter Fimrite, With Marijuana Going Legit, Marketing Blitz Takes a Hit, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE
(Oct. 18, 2016), available at http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/As-marijuana-goes-legal-marketingblitz-takes-9979294.php (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Vashon Velvet, a artisanal
grower on Vashon Island in Puget Sound, reaches customers through Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. The
slogan on the elegant packaging reads, ‘For the pursuit of Happiness.’ The plants go by names like Platinum
Blueberry, Laughing Buddha and, yes, Acapulco Gold”).
9. Nicole van Rensburg, Marijuana Marketing Strategies that Build Brand Equity, SMALL BUSINESS
TRENDS: MARKETING TIPS (Jan. 3, 2017), https://smallbiztrends.com/2017/01/marijuana-marketing.html (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
10. Roger Fillion, 4 Novel Marijuana Marketing Strategies, MARIJUANA BUSINESS MAGAZINE (July
2016), https://mjbizmagazine.com/4-novel-marijuana-marketing-strategies/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
11. Vauhini Vara, The Art of Marketing Marijuana, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 2016), https://www.theatlantic.
com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-art-of-marketing-marijuana/471507/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
12. Rick, Three Effective Strategies for Cannabis Marketing, MARIJUANA MARKETING GURUS (Aug. 1,
2015), http://marijuanamarketinggurus.com/three-effective-strategies-cannabis-marketing/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Brand marketing has become the most effective tool in the cannabis
industry as an increasing number of companies are targeting to expand their business across cities, states and
international boundaries”).
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Public health agencies cannot restrict psychological appeals embedded in
product messaging without running into the restrictions of the Constitution’s free
speech guarantee,13 which extends to commercial advertising.14 The category of
commercial speech includes all the many types of ways that sellers may try to
communicate with potential buyers, including graphics,15 images,16 colors,17

13. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech”); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incorporating the Constitution’s free speech guarantee to apply to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause).
14. Va. Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976). There is some
question whether the United States Constitution limits state regulation of cannabis advertising, so long as sale of
the product remains illegal federally. First Amendment protection for advertising applies only if it promotes a
“lawful” product or service. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980) (“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not
accurately inform the public about lawful activity”). Marijuana is not lawful at the federal level, and some
commentators have concluded that this means that the federal Constitution’s free speech guarantee does not
protect marijuana advertising in states where it is legal. Jacob Sullum, Are Marijuana Ad Restrictions
Constitutional?, REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG (Mar. 15, 2013), http://reason.com/blog/2013/03/15/aremarijuana-ad-restrictions-constituti (“Since marijuana is still prohibited by federal law, a First Amendment
challenge to advertising restrictions like those suggested by the task force would not be viable”) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review); Jacob Sullum, Legalize It, But Don’t Advertise It: High Times
Fights Colorado’s Restrictions on Marijuana-Related Speech, FORBES (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/jacobsullum/2014/08/28/legalize-it-but-dont-advertise-it-high-times-fights-colorados-onerousrestrictions-on-marijuana-related-speech/#4be33acb4656 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (quoting UCLA law Professor Eugene Volokh: “I don’t see how marijuana sales are lawful, given the
federal prohibition, so I think advertising marijuana is not protected under commercial speech doctrine”); Mont.
Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. Montana, 368 P.3d 1131, 1150 (Mont. 2016) (‘‘[A]n activity that is not permitted by
federal law—even if permitted by state law—is not a ‘lawful activity’ within the meaning of Central Hudson’s
first factor’’); Alex Kreit, What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look Like? 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 689, 714
(2015) (“Federal prohibition . . . allow[s] for a complete ban on marijuana advertising because there is no First
Amendment right to advertise the sale of an illegal good”). This conclusion, however, is not clearly correct.
Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of Worcester, Mass., 851 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (D. Mass. 2012)
(interpreting Supreme Court precedent to mean “that an activity is ‘lawful’ . . . so long as it is lawful where it
will occur”) (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)). Additionally, states may follow the lead of
California and interpret federal commercial speech doctrine into their own constitutional free speech guarantees.
Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 24 Cal. 4th 468, 490 (2000) (“[A]s to the points noted in our discussion of the
First Amendment’s free speech clause and its right to freedom of speech, article I’s free speech clause and its
right to freedom of speech, mutatis mutandis, are at least in accord” (emphasis in original)); id. at 493-94
(“[A]rticle I’s right to freedom of speech protects commercial speech, at least in the form of truthful and
nonmisleading messages about lawful products and services”); Jacob Sullum, Would Colorado’s Courts
Overturn Restrictions on Marijuana Ads?, REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG (Mar. 18, 2013), https://reason.com/
blog/2013/03/18/will-colorados-courts-overturn-restricti (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (quoting a Colorado lawyer who specializes in free speech: “The Colorado Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that Article II, Section 10, of the state constitution, which prohibits any law ‘impairing the
freedom of speech’ and promises that ‘every person shall be free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on
any subject,’ is more protective than the First Amendment”); Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 959 (2002)
(“This court has never suggested that the state and federal Constitutions impose different boundaries between
the categories of commercial and noncommercial speech” (emphasis in original)). In the face of uncertainty and
possible change in federal law, and to avoid expensive litigation, the federal free speech guarantee, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, should be the guidepost for state and local marijuana marketing regulations.
15. See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015)
(Confederate flag logo on proposed commemorative license plate); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v.
United States, 674 F.3d 509, 566-67 (6th Cir. 2012) (graphics on a cigarette warning label).
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lights, sounds,18 size,19 physical proximity, other attention-drawing devices such
as pop-up web advertisements, dangling in-store displays, or odd juxtaposed
images,20 and likely even undisclosed messaging, such as product placements21 or
hidden messaging.22 And the Supreme Court has interpreted increasingly rigid
limits on advertising regulations into the Constitution’s free speech guarantee,
leaving public health agencies very few means to counteract the barrage of
persuasive messaging aimed at expanding the consumer base and increasing per
capita consumption once the underlying sales transaction has been made legal.23
The doctrinal reality at the federal level, and the growing frenzy of
production and marketing on the ground in newly legalized states, makes it
crucial that agencies charged with protecting public health from abuse and
overuse of cannabis use the regulatory tools that do not implicate the free speech
guarantee. Whether a particular sales practice is “expressive” and protected by
the free speech guarantee hinges on whether the seller intends to communicate a
message by means of the conduct and whether an audience is likely to understand
it as a communication.24 Many aspects of cannabis sale transactions do not even

16. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 647-48 (1985)
(illustration of an intrauterine device in attorney advertisement); Saint John’s Church in the Wilderness v. Scott,
296 P.3d 273, 283 (Colo. Ct. App.), reh’g denied (Aug. 2, 2012) and cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2798 (2013)
(images of mutilated fetuses).
17. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (black armband); Jeglin
v. San Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 1459, 1461-62 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (colors and logos of sports
teams adopted by gangs).
18. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (music).
19. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (ordinance regulating size of
temporary directional signs); Peterson v. Village of Downers Grove, 150 F. Supp. 3d 910, 919-20 (N.D. Ill.
2015) (ordinance restricting total area of signage).
20. Rebecca Tushnet, Attention Must Be Paid: Commercial Speech, User-Generated Ads, and the
Challenge of Regulation, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 725 (2010) (“As we are exposed to more and more, it becomes
harder to get our attention, so promoters are forced to further extremes. Advertising clutter drives marketers to
put messages on fire hydrants and potholes, on eggs, in urinals, on the bellies of pregnant women, and anywhere
else that might surprise us out of our willful disregard.”).
21. Rita Marie Cain, Embedded Advertising on Television: Disclosure, Deception and Free Speech
Rights, 30 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 226, 230 (2011) (“[T]he law is clearly unsettled regarding undisclosed
advertising and whether it is inherently deceptive or entitled to free speech protection under the First
Amendment.”).
22. Liz Stinson, 12 Hidden Tricks Advertisers Use to Sell You Stuff, WIRED (June 11, 2014),
https://www.wired.com/2014/06/5-hidden-visual-tricks-advertisers-use-to-sell-you/ (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review) (noting, among other examples, that Heineken’s “e” is tilted backward to look like a
smile).
23. Regulators may seek to counteract the persuasive impact of advertising on consumers who may not
legally purchase the product, such as minors. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001)
(recognizing that the state may “protect[] children from tobacco advertisements”). The regulations must,
however, survive Central Hudson review. Id. at 567 (applying the Central Hudson test and finding that a
“blanket” restriction of in-store advertising below five feet high “does not constitute a reasonable fit with [the
goal of avoiding the enticing impact of tobacco advertising on children.]”).
24. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (conduct is expressive and protected by the First
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arguably send a communication. These include regulations of the quality and
potency of the products, the variety of products (liquid, weed, edible),
permissible product ingredients, the type and permissible locations and hours of
operation of retail vendors, retail licensing, minimum purchasing ages, and
maximum quantities of purchase.25 None of the heightened levels of Free Speech
Clause review apply to these types of regulations. They are subject only to
minimum due process and equal protection rational basis review.26
A particularly potent regulatory tool is product price adjustment. Tobacco27
and alcohol28 price adjustments directly affect the level of consumption, which,
in turn, averts public health harms.29 The first recommendation of the authors of a
2014 paper advising on developing public health regulations for marijuana is to
keep prices artificially high.30 The history of tobacco taxes as a public health
Amendment if “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding
circumstances the likelihood [i]s great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it”).
25. Institute of Medicine, Legal Strategies in Childhood Obesity Prevention: Workshop Summary 33
(2011), THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, https://www.nap.edu/read/13123/chapter/6 (last visited June 5,
2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Regulations on the sale and advertising of foods
can be tailored in a variety of ways so as not to constitute unlawful restrictions on free speech.. . . Increasing the
price of a product, limiting per capita purchases, banning or limiting harmful products or ingredients, and
instituting age limits on the sale of a product have all yielded benefits with other products and could be applied
to foods”); Restricting Tobacco Advertising and Promotions: Dealing with Legal Obstacles, COUNTER
TOBACCO.ORG (Feb. 9, 2016), http://countertobacco.org/restricting-tobacco-advertising-and-promotionsdealing-with-legal-obstacles/ (last visited June 5, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(“[S]olutions that do not involve restricting commercial speech include: Tobacco retailer licensing programs
and tobacco retailer reduction strategies, raising the minimum legal sales age to 21[and] banning tobacco sales
in pharmacies”).
26. Williams v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
27. Anne-Marie Perucic, Tobacco Control Economics, Tobacco Free Initiative, World Health
Organization, The Demand for Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products, Slides from presentation to TobTaxy
Capacity Building Workshop, Dublin, Ire. (Feb. 20-22, 2012), in http://www.who.int/tobacco/economics/
meetings/dublin_demand_for_tob_feb2012.pdf; NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, DIV. OF CANCER CONTROL &
POPULATION STUDIES, THE IMPACT OF TAX AND PRICE ON THE DEMAND FOR TOBACCO PRODUCTS,
MONOGRAPH 21: THE ECONOMICS OF TOBACCO AND TOBACCO CONTROL, (Jan. 2017) in
https://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/brp/tcrb/monographs/21/docs/m21_4.pdf.
28. Frank J. Chaloupka, Michael Grossman & Henry Saffer, The Effects of Price on Alcohol Consumption
and Alcohol-Related Problems, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH: NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON ALCOHOL ABUSE
AND ALCOHOLISM (Aug. 2002), https://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh26-1/22-34.htm (“The most
fundamental law of economics links the price of a product to the demand for that product. Accordingly,
increases in the monetary price of alcohol (i.e., through tax increases) would be expected to lower alcohol
consumption and its adverse consequences. Studies investigating such a relationship found that alcohol prices
were one factor influencing alcohol consumption among youth and young adults. Other studies determined that
increases in the total price of alcohol can reduce drinking and driving and its consequences among all age
groups; lower the frequency of diseases, injuries, and deaths related to alcohol use and abuse; and reduce
alcohol-related violence and other crime.”).
29. Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, et al., Developing Public Health Regulations for Marijuana: Lessons from
Alcohol and Tobacco, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1021, 1022 (June 2014), https://www. ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC4062005/ (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review) (“Hundreds of studies on
tobacco and alcohol show that raising prices reduces consumption and a long list of related health and social
harms.”).
30. Id.
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strategy, however, includes aggressive discounting strategies deployed by sellers
to counteract the effect on consumers.31 Popular discounting schemes include
coupons redeemable for cents or dollars off the price, volume discounts (e.g., buy
one, get one free), free samples, and free merchandise give-aways with a product
purchase (e.g., a free smokeless tobacco product with a cigarette purchase).32
A number of years ago, a majority of the Court’s Justices made clear that
regulations aimed at raising the price of alcohol to decrease demand do not
directly restrict speech and are not subject to Free Speech Clause scrutiny.33 This
distinction between constitutionally permissible prohibitions of the conduct of
price discounting to reduce demand, and impermissible restrictions of advertising
speech to achieve the same end, has held firm despite sellers’ efforts to
characterize “price” as “speech.”34 Recently, the Court held that a state law that
prohibits a retailer from “impos[ing] a surcharge” on credit card transactions
regulates speech.35 This interpretation, if not read carefully and in context, could
appear to upend the longstanding distinction between price regulations aimed at
conduct and advertising restrictions aimed at speech. Product manufacturers will
undoubtedly try to use the precedent aggressively to expand the range of
marketing restrictions subject to Free Speech Clause scrutiny.36 They must not
succeed. Public health agencies seeking to reduce demand for cannabis and other
health-hazard products must understand the meaning and limits of this recent
precedent, so that they can wield the tool of price regulation with confidence and
protect the boundary between conduct regulations that are subject to minimum
rational basis scrutiny even though they may impact speech incidentally, and
regulations that aim at speech directly and are subject to some level of Free

31. Tobacco Control Legal Consortium, Death on a Discount: Regulating Tobacco Product Pricing,
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW CENTER (Nov. 2015), http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/
resources/tclc-fs-death-on-discount-2015.pdf (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review) (“The tobacco
industry uses a variety of innovative pricing strategies to discourage current tobacco users from quitting, to
entice new customers to purchase their products, and to reduce the effectiveness of tobacco tax increases.”);
Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. Providence, R.I., 731 F.3d 71, 75 n.3 (1st Cir. 2013) (collecting
testimony and evidence).
32. Tobacco Control Legal Consortium, supra note 31.
33. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion)
(regulations that do “not involve any restriction on speech” include maintaining higher prices “by direct
regulation or by increased taxation”); id. at 530 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (other methods at the state’s disposal
“without intruding on sellers’ ability to provide truthful, nonmisleading information to consumers” are
“minimum prices” or “increase[ed] sales taxes”).
34. Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of New York, 27 F. Supp. 3d 415, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(rejecting manufacturers’ argument that coupons and discount offers are speech); Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco
Outlets, Inc. v. Providence, R.I., 731 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2013) (same).
35. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1150-51 (2017) (citing N.Y. Gen. Bus.
Law § 518).
36. Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of New York, 27 F. Supp. 3d 415, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(rejecting manufacturers’ argument that coupons and discount offers are speech); Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco
Outlets, Inc. v. Providence, R.I., 731 F.3d at 76 (1st Cir. 2013) (same).
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Speech Clause review.
II. BACKGROUND TO COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The Court first articulated the rationale for protecting commercial speech in
the context of reviewing a state restriction on price advertising.37 In Va. State Bd.
of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Court invalidated a state
law that prohibited advertising of prescription drug prices.38 In language repeated
through the line of later cases, the Court condemned what it characterized as the
“highly paternalistic approach” adopted by the state of keeping truthful price
information from consumers based on the assumption that they will not use it
well.39 According to the Court, the Constitution embodies the presumption “that
this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best
interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that
end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them.”40
Although it interpreted the Constitution to protect commercial speech, the Court
also noted “commonsense differences” between it and fully protected speech that
“suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow
of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired.” 41
In Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,42 the Court
borrowed from its intermediate-level test for assessing content-neutral time, place
or manner regulations to create a similar standard of review for commercial
speech restrictions.43 Under the Central Hudson test, courts assess the weight of
the government’s purpose and the degree of tailoring of the speech-restrictive
means apparent in the regulation more deferentially than they do when the
government restricts fully protected speech based upon its content. Specifically,
the Central Hudson test contains four prongs.44 The first prong is not a part of the
end/means balancing, but is rather a prerequisite to First Amendment
protection.45 For commercial speech to receive free speech protection, it must (1)

37. The Court began its movement toward interpreting commercial speech as protected in Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (“The relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services
does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.”).
38. Va. Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 771 n.24 (Specifically, “the greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech[] may make
it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker,” “appropriate to require that a
commercial message appear in such a form, or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers,
as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive,” and render “inapplicable the prohibition against prior
restraints.”).
42. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
43. Id.
44. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
45. Id. at 566 (“At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
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“concern lawful activity and not be misleading.”46 The other inquiries are: (2)
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial; (3) whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted; and (4) whether
the regulation is “not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”47
In subsequent cases, the Court has tightened the Central Hudson test, and
suggested that an unspecified type of “heightened scrutiny” applies to regulations
that suppress truthful commercial speech.48 Whatever the precise level of scrutiny
may be, the practical result of this movement in commercial speech jurisprudence
is that public health agencies will not prevail if their reason for restricting truthful
advertising is their “fear that people w[ill] make bad decisions” after receiving
persuasive messaging aimed at inducing them to make a legal purchase of a
potentially dangerous product.49 Although the ends may be legitimate, and even
highly important (“improved public health and reduced healthcare costs”), the
“indirect” means of “keep[ing] people in the dark for what the government
perceives to be their own good” will condemn the regulation as
unconstitutional.50 The “consumer’s concern for the free flow of commercial
speech” is particularly keen “in the fields of medicine and public health, where
information can save lives,”51 according to the Court.52
One additional wrinkle in commercial speech jurisprudence relevant to
public health regulators comes from the Court’s opinion in Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly.53 In that case, manufacturers and retailers challenged, among many
other things, restrictions on self-service displays, and on free samples and
promotional give-aways.54 The Court did not address the latter challenge because
it was not sufficiently briefed and argued.55 As to the requirement that tobacco
products be sold through sales staff, the Court applied its expressive conduct test
articulated in United States v. O’Brien.56 The O’Brien test applies when conduct
restricted by the government for reasons unrelated to communication can be used
Amendment”).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565 (2011).
49. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002).
50. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 577 (quoting 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (Stevens,
J., plurality opinion)).
51. Id. at 566 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)).
52. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 514 (1996) (rejecting an exception to usual
commercial speech restrictions for “vices”—products or activities that pose threats to public health or safety,
finding the “vice” label to be indeterminate, and “unaccompanied by a corresponding prohibition against the
commercial behavior at issue to provide a principled justification for the regulation of commercial speech about
that activity.”).
53. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
54. Id. at 534–36.
55. Id. at 553.
56. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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by some people as a means of speech.57 The state restricted self-service displays
for the purpose of preventing access by minors to the product.58 Tobacco retailers
argued that self-service displays sent a message through proximity to adult
consumers and by allowing consumers to receive messages from the product
itself through touch and smell.59
Without deciding, the Court assumed that the tobacco sellers had “a
cognizable speech interest in a particular means of displaying their products.”60
Because it applies in instances where the government’s purpose is not to suppress
messaging, the O’Brien test is significantly less rigorous than the modern Central
Hudson test. The Court found the government’s interest in preventing physical
access to the product by minors to be substantial, the means of preventing selfservice narrowly tailored, and alternate means of display to be available to the
tobacco sellers.61 Lorillard is a relevant reminder to public health regulators that
even pure, nonspeech intentions may not save their regulations from some level
of Free Speech Clause scrutiny. Nevertheless, the limits of Lorillard are
important for regulators to bear in mind as well. One of these is that the Court
assumed a speech interest in a particular type of marketing practice, without
deciding that it exists.62 The other is that the conduct at issue was a method of
marketing display, which is a means of interaction between the seller and the
customer, not an inherent attribute of the product, or of the sale transaction,
which can be spoken about in a marketing communication, but cannot be
independent means of speech.63
III. PRICE DISCOUNTING IN THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH FRAMEWORK
A. 44 Liquormart
After its decision in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court revisited the principles
that constrain government restrictions on price advertising in 44 Liquormart, Inc.
v. Rhode Island.64 Whereas in Virginia Pharmacy the Court reviewed the
57. Id. at 377 (“[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest”).
58. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 569-70.
59. Id. at 569.
60. Id. at 569-70.
61. Id.
62. See generally Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
63. Wine and Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 418 F.3d 36, 49 (1st Cir. 2005) (“It is the duty of the
party seeking to engage in allegedly expressive conduct to demonstrate that the First Amendment applies to that
conduct. W & S has offered no plausible argument as to why the provision of advertising services [separate
from the advertising itself] is an inherently expressive activity.”).
64. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).

75

2017 / Memo to Cannabis Regulators
constitutionality of the price restriction in light of the state’s purpose to promote
pharmacist “professionalism,” in 44 Liquormart the state’s purpose was to
promote public health by reducing excessive consumption of a potentially
dangerous product.65 The Court reviewed the constitutionality of the price
advertising ban in light of this public health purpose, and so the various opinions
written by the Justices to explain their reasoning, read together, provide the best
blueprint for regulators seeking to manage demand for newly legalized cannabis
products.66
The Justices delivered their decision through a number of opinions. Justice
Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court rejecting the state’s argument that the
Twenty-first Amendment provided it the authority to enact the price advertising
ban, and announcing the holding.67 He wrote a plurality opinion joined by
Justices Kennedy, Souter and Ginsberg, opining that review of “blanket bans” of
truthful commercial speech should be subject to stricter review than set out in the
Central Hudson test.68 Nevertheless, the Stevens plurality also applied the
Central Hudson test and found that the pricing advertising ban failed it. Justice
O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justices Rehnquist, Souter, and
Breyer, applying the Central Hudson test only, and reaching the same result at
the Stevens plurality.69 Justice Thomas noted that both the Stevens and O’Connor
pluralities appeared to adopt a “stricter, more categorical interpretation of the
fourth prong of Central Hudson” than in previous opinions, one that could, “as a
practical matter, go a long way toward [his position that strict scrutiny should
apply to restrictions of truthful commercial speech.]”70 As set out below,
application of Central Hudson’s fourth prong is where the Justices in their
various opinions have distinguished the unconstitutional means of restricting
price advertising from constitutionally permissible restrictions of price
discounting. So, points of agreement among the Justices at this part of the
analysis provide strong precedent for public health regulators to use the tool of
price discounting restrictions freely.
In 44 Liquormart, alcohol sellers challenged a state law that banned retail
price advertising except at the place of sale.71 The state’s goal was to promote
public health by reducing alcohol consumption. The state reasoned that higher
alcohol prices lead to lower alcohol consumption, and that competitive price
65. Id. at 504 (assuming the state’s interest in promoting temperance and discussing different meanings).
66. Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. Providence, R.I., 731 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2013) (“In
determining the views of the court as a whole, we may aggregate the views expressed in the various separate
opinions.”) (citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 413–14, 431–35 (2006); Moses
H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 17 (1983)).
67. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996).
68. Id. at 518 (Justice Thomas agreed with this conclusion but did not join the opinion).
69. Id. at 524 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
70. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
71. Id. at 504.
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advertisements lead to lower alcohol prices.72 The state thus used the means of
restricting price advertisements to achieve the intermediate goal of raising prices,
which, in turn, would achieve its primary public health purpose, which was to
reduce excessive drinking.73
The Stevens plurality pieced through this causation chain and accepted it as
reasonable.74 It nevertheless struck down the advertising ban. In the course of
doing so, it made clear that the constitutional problem with this type of regulation
aimed at raising prices is not the state’s objective of reducing demand for a
potentially dangerous product.75 It is within a state’s police powers to choose to
regulate product sellers to achieve this end. Instead, the constitutional defect is
the state’s use of the indirect means of restricting advertising rather than the
direct means of prohibiting discounting.76 Both the Stevens plurality’s
application of the Central Hudson test, and its reasoning confirm that the tool of
restricting price discounting in its many, demand-inducing manifestations, is
available to public health regulators free of Free Speech Clause constraints.
In applying the Central Hudson test, the Stevens plurality found that the state
failed to meet its third and fourth prongs.77 The third prong requires that the state
show that its speech-restrictive means directly or significantly advance its
interest. The Stevens plurality acknowledged that the price advertising ban “may
have some impact” on the consumption of some consumers.78 Nevertheless, it
picked apart the state’s evidence, questioning its details and relationship to the
goal of “temperance” in numerous particulars to support its conclusion that the
state had failed to show a sufficient relationship between the price advertising
ban and its goal of reducing alcohol consumption.79
Both the Stevens plurality and Justice O’Connor, with the Justices who
joined her concurring opinion, explained application of Central Hudson’s fourth
prong. Both found the price advertising ban to fail the requirement that it be
“no[] more extensive than necessary” because direct price regulation was a
constitutionally permissible tool to achieve the same end.80 The Stevens plurality
specifically noted that the alternatives of “direct regulation” or “increased
taxation” do “not involve any restriction on speech.”81 Justice O’Connor agreed
72. Id. at 505.
73. Id. at 505 (reciting the chain of reasoning).
74. Id. (finding that “common sense” supports the assertion that lower competition leads to higher prices,
and accepting as “reasonable” the assumption that higher prices reduce demand).
75. Id. at 504 (assuming that the state asserted a legitimate interest in promoting temperance, and
proceeding to evaluate the fit between the means and end under the other Central Hudson test prongs).
76. Id. at 507 (finding that the state “failed to establish a “reasonable fit” between its abridgment of
speech and its temperance goal).
77. Id. at 507–08.
78. Id. at 506.
79. Id. at 506–07.
80. Id. at 508, 534.
81. Id. at 507.
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that “other methods at [the state’s] disposal” such as “establishing minimum
prices” or “increasing sales taxes” would “more directly accomplish th[e] stated
goal without intruding on [protected speech.]”82
Justice Thomas distinguished impermissible price advertising restrictions
from permissible regulations of marketing conduct, such as pricing, in even
greater detail. He read the Stevens and O’Connor opinions as “commit[ting] the
courts to striking down restrictions on speech whenever a direct regulation (i.e., a
regulation involving no restriction on speech regarding lawful activity at all)
would be an equally effective method of dampening demand by legal users.”83 As
examples of permissible direct regulations, he listed “directly banning a product
(or rationing it, taxing it, controlling its price, or otherwise restricting its sale in
specific ways).”84 He noted that “direct regulation is, in one sense, more
restrictive of conduct generally [than restrictions of advertising],” because
consumers will have no access to particular types of products, prices, or places of
purchase.85 In his view, however, and in the views of the Justices expressed in
other opinions, more restrictive conduct restrictions are permissible because they
are politically visible86 and within states’ police powers87 whereas the Free
Speech Clause prohibits states from using the means of suppressing truthful
speech to achieve the permissible end of “dampening demand.”88
B. Recent Lower Court Decisions
In recent decisions, a panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals and a district
court in the Southern District of New York upheld local tobacco price restrictions
against manufacturers’ claims that the regulations violated their free speech
rights. The First Circuit court addressed a City of Providence ordinance that
restricted tobacco and cigarette retailers from reducing prices through coupons or

82. Id. at 530 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
83. Id. at 524.
84. Id. at (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
85. Id. (emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 509. The Stevens plurality opinion went on to address arguments for deference to the state’s
choice of means. In refusing to defer to the state’s choice to restrict advertising, the plurality repeatedly
emphasized the difference between indirect speech restrictions and direct restrictions of conduct, such as
pricing, to which the Court defers. First, the state argued that it should be permitted to choose to suppress
advertising if the evidence as to the efficacy of this means is mixed. The plurality rejected this argument, noting
that the Constitution precludes deference toward the choice of the means of suppressing speech because it
shields the state’s underlying policy choice to blunt demand for a legal product or activity from “the public
scrutiny that more direct, nonspeech regulation would draw.”
87. Id. at 512 (“commercial speech concerns products and services that the government may freely
regulate”).
88. Id. at 526 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 512 (“attempts to
regulate speech are more dangerous than attempts to regulate conduct” and so “speech restrictions cannot be
treated as simply another means that the government may choose to achieve its ends”) (plurality opinion).
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multi-pack discounts “(e.g., ‘buy-two-get-one-free’ [offers]).”89 The court noted
that the city enacted the ordinance for the purpose of reducing youth tobacco
use.90 It cited evidence demonstrating that youth are particularly price-sensitive
and tobacco companies exploit this price sensitivity through various types of
discounting, which provokes youth initiation and creates addicted consumers.91
The court acknowledged that “[p]ricing information concerning lawful
transactions has been held to be protected speech,” but distinguished the
Providence restrictions of “pricing practices” from restrictions on the
“dissemination of pricing information.”92 Relying on the combined opinions of
the Justices in 44 Liquormart, it concluded that “price regulations designed to
discourage consumption do not violate the First Amendment.”93 It also rejected
the sellers’ claim that prices are expressive conduct, subject to the O’Brien test.94
It distinguished the Lorillard Court’s comments about self-service cigarette
marketing, noting that in that case, the regulated activity pertained to “the display
and dissemination of information to consumers.”95
At issue in the second decision was a New York City ordinance that
prohibited various forms of tobacco discounting, including coupons, multi-pack
promotions, gifts with sale, and other promotions offering tobacco products
below their list price.96 The practical effect of the ordinance was that the only
way for manufacturers or retailers to change the price of tobacco products was to
change the listed price. The district court noted legislative findings showing the
city’s purpose to “reduce tobacco use among adults and to prevent youths from
beginning to use tobacco products” and that “numerous studies have
demonstrated that high tobacco prices reduce consumption among both youths,
who are especially price-sensitive, and adults.”97
Once again, tobacco sellers argued that the price restrictions should be
subject to Free Speech Clause scrutiny. Specifically, they claimed that they “use
coupons and discount offers to tell their consumers that they are ‘getting a deal’
if they purchase the product at a particular price, to encourage them to purchase a
particular brand, or to make their purchase at a particular location.”98 The court,
89. Providence, R.I., Code of Ordinances § 14–303 (prohibiting retailers from “accept[ing] or
redeem[ing], [or] offer[ing] to accept or redeem . . . any coupon that provides any tobacco products without
charge or for less than the listed or non-discounted price,” and from “sell[ing] tobacco products to consumers
through any multi-pack discounts. . .”).
90. Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc., v. Providence, R.I., 731 F.3d 71, 75 (1st Cir. 2013).
91. Id. at 75 n.3 (1st Cir. 2013).
92. Id. at 77.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 78.
95. Id.
96. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 17–176.1(b) and § 17–176.1(c), cited in Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc.,
v. City of New York, 27 F. Supp. 3d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
97. Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d at 417-18.
98. Id. at 421.
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citing from the First Circuit’s recent decision, distinguished regulation of
commercial speech from regulation of pricing practices.99 Like the First Circuit,
the court read the combined opinions of the Justices in 44 Liquormart to
“demonstrate that price regulations designed to discourage consumption of a
potentially harmful product do not violate the First Amendment so long as they
do not preclude the effected retailers’ ability to provide truthful, nonmisleading
information about the regulated product to consumers.”100 The court emphasized
that the New York ordinance “only regulates an economic transaction—the sale
of tobacco products below the listed price,” not “the dissemination of pricing
information.”101 For this reason, the court found the ordinance “does not violate
the First Amendment.”102
In reaching this conclusion, the court reviewed the numerous methods of
discounting prohibited by the New York ordinance, and found them all to
permissibly regulate conduct and not speech. According to the court, “These
regulations are different variations of the same strategy—regulating the sale of
cigarettes and tobacco products below the listed price—that simply approach the
issue in a different manner.”103 Finally, the court rejected the sellers’ contention
that the ordinance restricted speech because it precluded “offering to sell
cigarettes and tobacco products below the listed price.”104 The court noted that
“offers to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First
Amendment protection.”105 “In this case,” it said, “the offers that are restricted by
the ordinance are offers to engage in an unlawful activity—namely, the sale of
cigarettes and tobacco products below the listed price.”106 Consequently, “the
ordinance lawfully prohibits retailers from offering what the ordinance explicitly
forbids them to do.”107
IV. EXPRESSIONS HAIR DESIGN V. SCHNEIDERMAN
These lower court applications of Supreme Court precedent confirm that
regulations aimed at prohibiting any of the many methods of price discounting by
sellers impact the conduct of engaging in a sales transaction, not speech. This
remains true despite the Court’s recent decision in Expressions Hair Design v.
Schneiderman, 137 S.Ct. 1144 (2017). In that case, the Court interpreted a

99. Id. at 422.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 423.
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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statute that appears on its face to regulate pricing conduct only, to abridge
speech.108 A bizarre and confusing statutory history unique to the statute at
issue109 explains the Court’s holding. Nevertheless, product sellers will likely
seek to use it to cut away at the legitimate scope of public health regulatory
authority. Therefore, it is crucial to parse the Court’s brief reasoning with care.
A close reading confirms that its holding hinged on statutory interpretation,
specifically interpretation of the particular government regulator’s intent, and
does not in any way undercut or change the core doctrinal distinction between
pricing conduct and speech. Regulators must understand the place of this
decision in commercial speech jurisprudence to craft regulations, defend against
challenges, and hold their ground.
The Expressions Hair Design case arose out of a longstanding battle between
credit card companies and merchants.110 Merchants do not like to pay transaction
fees to credit card companies, and many would like to pass the extra cost along to
consumers who choose to pay with cards. Credit card companies succeeded in
getting Congress, for a time,111 and then state legislatures,112 to prohibit
merchants from imposing “surcharges” on credit card transactions. At the same
time, merchants could offer “discounts” to consumers who chose to pay with
cash.113 New York General Business Law section 518 explicitly prohibited
“surcharge[s],” and although the provision did not say so explicitly, all parties
agreed that the statute did not bar sellers from offering an equivalent “discount”
to consumers who use cash.114 This apparent economic anomaly was the focal
point at all levels of review.
The lower courts reached different results as to whether the statute regulated
speech or conduct. The district court imported the history of the
surcharge/discount oddity at the federal level into its interpretation of the state
legislature’s intent. As the district court recited the history, after Congress
banned credit card companies from prohibiting discounts for paying in cash by
108. N.Y. Gen Bus. Law § 518 (“No seller in any sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a holder
who elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means.”).
109. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Alice in
Wonderland has nothing on [the challenged provision.]”), vacated by 803 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2015).
110. Id. at 438 (the challenged provision “is the product of a decades-long battle between credit card
companies on the one hand and retailers and consumer advocates on the other”).
111. Id. (noting that Congress allowed the no-surcharge provision of the Truth in Lending Act to lapse in
1984).
112. Id. at 439 n.2 (citing statutes).
113. Id. at 438 (explaining that in response to credit card contract provisions prohibiting surcharges,
Congress amended the Truth in Lending Act to provide that credit card companies could not prohibit merchants
from “offering a discount to a cardholder to induce the cardholder to pay by cash, check, or similar means rather
than use a credit card.” Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 93–495, tit. III, § 306, 88 Stat. 1500, 1515 (1974)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1666f(a)), and later, at the urging of credit card companies, passed another amendment
to the Truth in Lending Act, prohibiting merchants from imposing “surcharges.” Act of Feb. 27, 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94–222, § 3(c), 90 Stat. 197, 197 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1666f(a) (1980)).
114. Id. at 436 (citing N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 518).
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means of contracts with retailers, “the battleground moved from whether
merchants could charge different prices for cash and credit to how merchants
could communicate those different prices to consumers.”115 Enactment of the
federal precursor to Section 518 was a victory for the credit card industry.116
Earlier in its recitation of the facts, the district court had pointed to psychological
studies, known to regulators at the federal and state levels, which show that,
despite their economic equivalence, consumers perceive surcharges and
discounts quite differently.117 Customers dislike surcharges, but like discounts.
According to the district court, the provision “dr[ew] the line between prohibited
“surcharges” and permissible “discounts” based on words and labels, rather than
economic realities” and so “regulate[d] speech, not conduct.”118 Specifically, the
history of the provision showed that credit card companies sought the provision,
at the federal and then state levels, to prevent retailers from provoking an adverse
consumer reaction to their product by attaching the word “surcharge” or “extra
charge” to it,119 when that is precisely what the retailers wanted to do.120 The
court acknowledged that “[p]ricing is a routine subject of economic regulation,”
but contrasted “the manner in which price information is conveyed” as
“quintessentially expressive, and therefore protected by the First Amendment.”121
In the view of the district court, because the provision permitted retailers to
charge more for credit card transactions, it did not prohibit the conduct of
charging a surcharge, but rather the use of the word.122
115. Id. at 438.
116. Id. (“In 1976, at the urging of the credit card industry, Congress passed another amendment to the
Truth in Lending Act, providing, as section 518 now provides, that “[n]o seller in any sales transaction may
impose a surcharge on a cardholder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar
means.” Act of Feb. 27, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–222, § 3(c), 90 Stat. 197, 197 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1666f(a)
(1980))”).
117. Id. at 436 (“A number of studies have indicated, however, that consumers perceive credit-card
surcharges negatively as a kind of loss or penalty, while cash discounts are perceived positively as a kind of
gain or bonus. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 193, 199 (1991); Adam Levitan, The
Antitrust Super Bowl: America’s Payment Systems, No–Surcharge rules, and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3
Berkeley Bus. L.J. 265, 280–81 (2006); see also S.Rep. No. 97–23, at 3 (‘The [U.S. Senate Banking]
Committee recognizes that while discounts for cash and surcharges on credit cards may be mathematically the
same, their practical effect and the impact they may have on consumers is very different.’”)).
118. Id. at 442.
119. Id. at 438 (no-charge provision at the federal level was passed “at the urging of the credit card
industry”); Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2015) (““[C]redit-card
surcharges are more effective than cash discounts at discouraging credit-card use among consumers, which has
naturally led credit-card companies to oppose them. See Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer
Choice, 1 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 39, 45 (1980)”), vacated and remanded by 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).
120. Id. at 437 (“Plaintiffs . . . want to impose credit card surcharges, rather than give cash discounts, and
to so inform their customers, precisely because consumers are more likely then to notice the fees, dislike them,
and switch to cash in order to avoid them”).
121. Id. at 445.
122. Id. at 447.
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The Court of Appeals, by contrast, interpreted the no-surcharge provision to
have concrete economic significance that could exist along with permitted
discounting. The court acknowledged the psychological literature documenting
that consumers react differently to surcharges than to discounts.123 It also noted
other reasons why a legislature might choose to “prohibit credit-card surcharges
specifically.”124 With these possibilities in mind, it characterized as
“bewildering” the retailers’ “persistence in equating the actual imposition of a
credit-card surcharge (i.e., a seller’s choice to charge an additional amount above
the sticker price to its credit-card customers) with the words that speakers of
English have chosen to describe that pricing scheme (i.e., the term “credit-card
surcharge”).”125 The court of appeals relied on the face of the statute, concluding
that “[w]hether a seller is imposing a credit-card surcharge—in other words,
whether it is doing what the statute, by its plain terms, prohibits—can be
determined wholly without reference to the words that the seller uses to describe
its pricing scheme.”126 So, in the view of the court of appeals, the provision
simply prohibited a retailer from engaging in the conduct of posting a sticker
price and charging more to credit card payers. Under its reading, the provision
did not “prohibit sellers from referring to credit-cash price differentials as creditcard surcharges, or from engaging in advocacy related to credit-card
surcharges.”127
The court of appeals specifically refuted the claim that “credit-card
surcharges and cash discounts must just be labels because consumers react
differently to them.”128 Instead, it observed, “consumers react negatively to
credit-card surcharges not because surcharges “communicate” any particular
“message,” but because consumers dislike being charged extra.”129 After
distinguishing the different sales behaviors—speech or conduct—that may
provoke adverse customer reactions, the court of appeals went on to note that the
Constitution treats laws aimed at protecting consumers from adverse reactions to
the different types of sales behaviors dramatically differently.130 “Although the

123. Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 122 (“A psychological phenomenon known as ‘loss aversion’
means that ‘changes that make things worse (losses) loom larger than improvements or gains’” of an equivalent
amount. Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J.
Econ. Persp. 193, 199 (1991)”).
124. Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 122-23 (These include “protecting consumers from the
inconvenience and annoyance of having extra charges added to their bills,” avoiding “adverse economic effects
on the broader economy by “dampen[ing] retail sales,” preventing retailers from adding more than the creditcard swipe charge as a “surcharge,” and creating the opportunity for “dishonest sellers [to] profit at their
customers’ expense by imposing surcharges surreptitiously at the point of sale”).
125. Id. at 132.
126. Id. at 131.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 132-33.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 133.
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First Amendment generally prevents the government from justifying a speech
restriction by reference to the harmful reactions that the speech in question will
cause among the reading or listening public,” the court of appeals observed,
“there is nothing controversial about the government’s banning certain prices
because of how consumers will react to them.”131 As it interpreted the purpose
and operation of Section 518, it regulated conduct, not speech.132
The Supreme Court adopted the district court’s reading of the New York
statute. The Court narrowed its review to an as-applied challenge, interpreting
Section 518 as prohibiting “posting a cash price and an additional credit card
surcharge, expressed either as a percentage surcharge or a “dollars-and-cents”
additional amount.”133 The Court followed, and agreed with, the first steps in the
court of appeals’ reasoning. The Court accepted the court of appeals’
determination that Section 518 prohibited the pricing practice described in the
hypothetical signs.134 The Court next turned to the question whether Section 518
regulated conduct or speech.135 The Court agreed with the court of appeals’
statement of the principle, drawn from 44 Liquormart, that “price controls
regulate conduct alone.”136 It offered the example of a law requiring all delis to
charge $10 for their sandwiches.137 Such a law, it said, would regulate conduct
not speech, and this would be true even though delis would, in turn, communicate
the pricing in advertising.138 Although the price control would indirectly dictate
the speech of the delis, the law itself, according to the Court, would regulate
conduct, not speech.139 The Court also agreed with the court of appeals that “[a]
law regulating the relationship between two prices regulates speech no more than
a law regulating a single price.”140 So, for example, if the New York statute had
131. Id.
132. Id. at 133.
133. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1149 (2017) (“Under this pricing
approach, petitioner Expressions Hair Design might, for example, post a sign outside its salon reading ‘Haircuts
$10 (we add a 3% surcharge if you pay by credit card).’ Or, petitioner Brooklyn Farmacy & Soda Fountain
might list one of the sundaes on its menu as costing ‘$10 (with a $0.30 surcharge for credit card users)’”).
Although the Court described its review as of a particular “pricing practice,” id., the practice it describes is
“posting” and “express[ion.].”
134. Id. at 1150.
135. In narrowing the challenge, the Court somewhat confusingly described its review as of a statutory
prohibition of a particular “pricing practice” when its ultimate conclusion is that Section 518 regulates speech.
The Court makes clear that the Constitution permits regulators to prohibit the conduct of imposing credit card
surcharges over a cash price by, for example, setting a uniform price. Id. (a law setting a uniform sandwich
price regulates conduct). And, its hypothetical applications involve “posting” and “express[ing]” the price. Id.
So, more accurately, the Court narrowed its review to whether Section 518 prohibited a particular way of
expressing a “pricing practice” rather than the “pricing practice” itself.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1150-51.
140. Id. at 1150.
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said that credit and cash prices must be the same, the law would regulate conduct,
not speech. But, the Court continued, the New York statute was “different.”141
Instead of reading the meaning of “surcharge” in light of a hypothetical sticker
price, as had the court of appeals, the Court focused on the fact that the statute
did not regulate the relationship between the credit card and cash prices. Like the
district court, the Court took the view that because the law did not regulate this
relationship, it could only regulate how the relationship is expressed.142 The
Court thus remanded the case to the court of appeals to consider whether Section
518 can be upheld as a speech regulation.143
V. REGULATORS’ UNCHANGED AUTHORITY TO RESTRICT THE PRICING
PRACTICE OF DISCOUNTING AFTER EXPRESSIONS HAIR DESIGN
The review of the Court’s recent Expressions Hair Design decision, in light
of its peculiar facts and the opinions of the district court and court of appeals,
confirms that public health regulators’ authority to restrict discounting, in all
types of ways, remains intact and unchanged. The Court’s willingness to look
beyond the face of Section 518 was provoked by the parties’ concession that it
simultaneously prohibited “surcharges” for credit card transactions while it
permitted “discounts” for cash. This concession wiped away the plain meaning of
a “surcharge” as a payment above the cash price, and provoked the search for an
explanation for the bizarre juxtaposition, which had already included information
beyond the statute’s words. There is no reason to believe that public health
regulators will emulate this odd provision, or that the Court’s decision based
upon its interpretation of one statute’s particular purpose and application impacts
their authority to regulate price, directly and exclusively.
Rather than limiting regulators’ authority to restrict price to reduce demand
for potentially dangerous products, the Expressions Hair Design decision, in its
few words, affirms it. A “typical price regulation,” according to the Court, is well
within public health regulators’ authority.144 Regulators may have many different
reasons for regulating a product’s price, including suppressing demand by
eliminating the narcotic effect of discounts on consumers. Setting a uniform price
for a product is one of the “typical” price regulation techniques.145 Maintaining a
uniform price requires multiple additional techniques to combat sellers’ efforts to
subvert it. The Constitution permits regulators to prohibit all forms of product
141. Id. at 1151.
142. Id. (Section 518 regulated “how sellers may communicate their prices”).
143. Id. (noting that the parties contested “whether § 518 is a valid commercial speech regulation under
Central Hudson . . . and whether the law can be upheld as a valid disclosure requirement under Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652
(1985)”).
144. Id. at 1150-51.
145. Id.
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discounting, so long as in doing so they aim at maintaining a price level and not
at restricting messaging.146
In addition to setting a minimum price, regulators may employ all of the
techniques in the New York and Providence ordinances, upheld by the lower
courts,147 and more. These include prohibiting coupon discounts, multi-pack
discounts, free samples, and free gifts with purchases. Regulators should take
care to restrict the price transaction without reference to messaging.148 So, for
example, regulators may prohibit offering to lower the price of the product by
any means, including a coupon, and redemption of a coupon that lowers the
price. While it is true that coupons typically contain product advertising in
addition to the discount offer, so long as the regulation does not forbid the
product advertising, sellers remain free to disseminate it, via hard copy or social
media, just without an offer of a price reduction.149 Similarly, samples and gifts
may bear logos and other messaging. Once again, a restriction that aims at price
reduction only, prohibiting undercutting price controls by offering free product or
any sort of free thing tied to a product purchase without reference to whether it is
branded with messaging, regulates pricing conduct and is within public health
regulators’ authority.150
VI. CONCLUSION
Like vivid words, images, and graphics, discounts may trigger psychic
reactions in consumers that prompt them to buy. Unlike the crafty advertising
techniques, however, public health regulators can restrict the many methods of
price discounting freely for the purpose of moderating demand for newly
legalized cannabis. The Court’s recent decision in Expressions Hair Design
hinged on its interpretation of a particular legislature’s intent, evaluating a
specific, and seemingly contradictory, statutory scenario that can be easily
avoided by drafters. So long as regulators restrict discounting for the purpose of
limiting the effect that the pricing practice has on consumers, the Expressions
Hair Design decision stands as no limit on their authority. Cannabis sellers will
be bold in using the broadest range of media and persuasive techniques to expand
146. Id.
147. Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of New York, 27 F. Supp. 3d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2014);
Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. Providence, R.I., 731 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2013).
148. See supra note 84 (distinguishing laws restricting free samples because of their “communicative”
impact from laws restricting free samples for the purpose of maintaining a uniform minimum price).
149. Cf. Lorillard (noting that cigarette sellers’ speech interest could be fulfilled by allowing displays of
empty packages, while keeping the product itself out of the self-service displays).
150. Sellers remain free to distribute branded products for free, so long as the distribution is not tied to a
sale. 674 F.3d at 538 (noting that the government had not “articulated an interest in generally regulating the
distribution of T-shirts, baseball caps, bobblehead dolls, or any other merchandise that may be available [as a
reward for steady customers]”).
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their customer base. Although regulators must watch with dismay as sellers
manipulate consumer reactions by means of advertising, they can be as bold as
cannabis vendors in combatting consumer reactions to the pricing practice of
discounts.
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